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Alan Turing’s Electronic Nightmare:
The Struggle to Build the ACE  
Computer
J. Michael Beaver
 “Everything faded into mist. The past was erased, 
the erasure was forgotten, the lie became truth.”1
Alan Turing’s role in the creation of the modern computer is 
peculiar because his work during the Second World War was 
shrouded in secrecy and his association with the Hungarian-
American computing pioneer John von Neumann muddied 
his pioneering work immediately after the war. Turing’s 
post-war Automatic Computing Engine (ACE) project at the 
National Physical Laboratory (NPL) in London was one of 
his more significant contributions to the development of the 
modern computer. However, the story of the ACE computer 
seems to be particularly lost in popular history. For instance, 
the Encyclopedia Britannica entry for “computer” features an 
omission of Turing’s ACE project, though it discusses Turing’s 
other work.2 Turing’s ACE project did not see a considerable 
amount of success until after his untimely death. John von 
Neumann’s work on computer design is best known for 
the eponymous “von Neumann architecture,” and he saw 
1  George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four, Part I, Chapter 7.
2  Paul A. Freiberger, David Hemmendinger, William Morton Pottenger, and Michael R. 
Swaine, “Computer,” in Encyclopedia Britannica, last modified July 5, 2012, http://www.
britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/130429/computer. 
6 Articles 
considerable success in his lifetime. Turing’s ACE featured 
a novel design that rivaled von Neumann’s design, but its 
story has been partially lost in history. If Turing’s ACE had 
the same successful influence as von Neumann’s design, 
there would exist the “Turing architecture” and the “von 
Neumann architecture”; however, there is only the latter.3 The 
commercial and practical failure of Turing’s ACE computing 
project can be attributed to the confluence of several counter-
productive influences. Conflicting goals, poor relationships, 
and exceedingly poor administration ultimately led to the 
failure of Turing’s ACE project.
 After the Second World War, Britain needed 
desperately to reassert its presence on the international 
stage. The shift to a Labour government in 1945 spawned an 
interest to exploit the new field of computational research 
as one method to reassert Britain’s dominance. Sir Charles 
G. Darwin, director of the NPL and grandson of naturalist 
Charles Darwin, sought to participate in this initiative 
by establishing a national computer project at the NPL. 
Darwin charged John R. Womersley, supervisor of the NPL 
3  This is not to say that Turing has not had lasting impacts on computer science as a 
discipline. He contributed the founding theories of artificial intelligence, programming, 
and architectural design. We are concerned with the development of a practical modern 
computing machine, not one of his theoretical projects.
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Mathematics Division, with the construction of the machine.4 
Womersley’s proposed national computer was a machine 
that could solve all of Britain’s computational needs for the 
future.5 On the international stage, as David Leavitt reports, 
the United States was quickly surpassing Britain in the field of 
computational research, which pressured the NPL to engage 
in serious computational research.6 The increase in pressure 
provided Womersley with initiative to start the research 
program as soon as possible. 
 As part of his national computer initiative, Womersley 
recruited Alan Turing in 1945.7 Womersley was aware of 
Turing’s 1936 paper “On Computable Numbers, With an 
Application to the Entscheidungsproblem,” which would 
become the genesis of the Turing Machine. Womersley’s 
ingenious idea was to have Turing design and construct the 
new national computer: the Automatic Computing Engine.8 
However, there was a conflict of interests as Darwin and 
Womersley were interested in a machine that could service 
4  John Hendry, Innovating for Failure: Government Policy and the Early British Computer 
Industry (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1989), 34. Up until 1945, most computing machines 
were complex electromechanical contraptions conceived to perform one specialized task 
exceptionally well. The Electronic Numerical Integrator and Calculator (ENIAC), designed 
by J. Presper Eckert and John Mauchly, is a notable example. The ENIAC featured a complex, 
convoluted design, and it was frustrating to operate. After von Neumann joined the ENIAC 
team as an adviser, he produced the “First Draft of a Report on the EDVAC,” which proposed 
the “von Neumann architecture,” as it is known today. For more information, see William 
Aspray, John von Neumann and the Origins of Modern Computing (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1990), 34-9.
5  Andrew Hodges, Alan Turing: The Enigma (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), 306.
6  David Leavitt, The Man Who Knew Too Much: Alan Turing and the Invention of the Computer 
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2006), 199.
7  Simon Lavington, “ACES and DEUCES,” in Alan Turing and His Contemporaries: Building 
the World’s First Computers, ed. Simon Lavington (Swindon, UK: BCS, 2012), 11-2.
8  Ibid. Turing was fond of remarking that Womersley’s greatest contribution to the ACE 
project was its name. Womersley’s idea, the word “engine” was a “deliberate reference to 
Charles Babbage’s unfinished” 1837 Analytical Engine. For more information, see Hodges, 
317 and Lavington, “ACES and DEUCES,” 13.
8 Articles 
the entire country and solve its mathematical problems.9 
Turing, on the other hand, saw the ACE as an opportunity 
to realize his 1936 concept of a Universal Turing Machine.10 
Nevertheless, Turing drafted a design for the machine, and his 
proposal was finished at the end of 1945. The NPL’s Executive 
Committee approved the project, and construction officially 
began on August 18, 1947.11
 Darwin and Womersley’s desire for a glorified 
calculator to solve the country’s numerical problems was 
not entirely consistent with Turing’s view.12 While Turing 
understood the importance of national numerical work,13 
he saw the ACE as an opportunity to do so much more. 
During his wartime codebreaking work at Bletchley Park, 
Turing worked with non-numerical logic problems, and he 
understood the significance of such problems.14 Turing’s 
vision surpassed the short-term goal of number crunching; 
his ultimate goal was a machine that was universal, or general 
in purpose. The ACE, Turing hoped, would be able to handle 
any problem, numerical or non-numerical.15 What is more, 
9  Simon Lavington, Early British Computers: The Story of Vintage Computers and the People Who 
Built Them (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1980), 23-4.
10  Hodges, 318.
11  It is worth noting that development on the ACE had begun in late 1945 and persisted 
throughout 1946. The actual ACE—or, rather, the Pilot ACE—began on this date. See also 
Hendry, 34 and Hodges, 367.
12  Lavington, Early British Computers, 23-4.
13  Turing apparently entertained the idea of nationalized computer stations. In fact, in a 
lecture to the London Mathematical Society on February 20, 1947, he mused that a distant 
computer could be operated by use of a special telephone line. Perhaps this was Turing’s 
naïve conception of a primitive computer network. He optimistically concluded that the cost 
would be no more than a few hundred pounds. See also A. M. Turing, “Lecture to L.M.S. Feb. 
20 1947.” Lecture to the London Mathematical Society, London, UK, February 20, 1947.
14  Hodges, 365.
15  Teresa Numerico, “From Turing machine to ‘electronic brain,’” in Alan Turing’s Automatic 
Computing Engine: The Master Codebreaker’s Struggle to Build the Modern Computer, ed. B. Jack 
Copeland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 181.
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Turing saw the ACE as an opportunity to capitalize on his 
computer-brain metaphor: a computing machine can emulate 
the human brain.16 The ACE would embody the philosophy 
of the Universal Turing Machine: a machine that could be 
programmed to perform the tasks of any other machine.17 
If the ACE could be programmed to perform any task, then 
it could theoretically be programmed to mimic a sort of 
primitive artificial intelligence, which was Turing’s goal.
 John von Neumann’s “First Draft of a Report on the 
EDVAC”18 served as the initial inspiration for Turing’s ACE 
proposal. Von Neumann’s EDVAC Report was a high-level 
abstract amalgamation of the various ideas that resulted from 
various conversations with his colleagues.19 In principle, the 
EDVAC Report was a conceptual framework from which a 
group could consult while building a machine. John Hendry, 
Fellow of Girton College, University of Cambridge, notes 
most British researchers were “content to follow the well-
disseminated and authoritative work of von Neumann, 
[which was] encapsulated in the EDVAC report.”20 Womersley 
obtained a copy of it and gave it to Turing,who accepted 
the legitimacy of von Neumann’s work, but was “keen” to 
implement his own ideas about computing machines.21 
 While Turing’s ACE design drew upon the EDVAC 
16  Hodges, 293-4.
17  William Aspray, John von Neumann and the Origins of Modern Computing (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1990), 176.
18  Electronic Discrete Variable Automatic Computer, or EDVAC.
19  Jon Agar, Turing and the Universal Machine: The Making of the Modern Computer 
(Cambridge, UK: Icon, 2001),115-6.
20  Hendry, 34.
21  Hodges, 306.
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Report, his actual proposal was a much more detailed 
realization of the abstract EDVAC machine.22 Turing specified 
that his ACE proposal should be read in conjunction with 
von Neumann’s EDVAC Report.23 The proposal had been 
described as the first complete, detailed description of 
electronic stored-program digital computer.24 Indeed, Turing’s 
ACE proposal was the first detailed plan for constructing a 
Universal Turing Machine.25 However, it is intriguing that 
Turing’s ACE proposal draws more upon von Neumann’s 
work than his own; the ACE proposal is much more heavily 
influenced by the EDVAC Report than Turing’s own 1936 
paper.26 It is worth noting that von Neumann’s EDVAC 
Report makes implicit, indirect use of Turing Machines, 
though he does not make explicit references to Turing’s 1936 
paper.27 Although von Neumann indirectly used Turing’s 
ideas, his EDVAC design differed greatly from Turing’s ACE 
design.
 Presumably Womersley wanted Turing to build an 
EDVAC-type machine but give it a twist to make it distinctly 
British. Turing’s design was a radical departure from von 
22  Numerico, 181.
23  Hodges, 318.
24  B. E. Carpenter and R. W. Doran, “The Other Turing Machine,” in The Computer Journal 
20, no. 3 (1977), 269.
25  B. Jack Copeland and Diane Proudfoot, “What Turing Did after He Invented the 
Universal Turing Machine,” Journal of Logic, Language, and Information 9, no. 4 (2000): 491.
26  Martin Campbell-Kelly, “The ACE and the shaping of British computing,” in Alan 
Turing’s Automatic Computing Engine: The Master Codebreaker’s Struggle to Build the Modern 
Computer, ed. B. Jack Copeland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 156-7.
27  Leavitt, 201. Von Neumann’s EDVAC Report only made explicit reference to a biophysics 
article by McCulloch and Pitts. In their article, McCulloch and Pitts used Turing Machines 
to describe neural nets. For further discussion, see B. Jack Copeland and Diane Proudfoot, 
“Turing and the computer,” in Alan Turing’s Automatic Computing Engine: The Master 
Codebreaker’s Struggle to Build the Modern Computer, ed. B. Jack Copeland (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 113.
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Neumann’s original design. As a logician, Turing took great 
pains to improve on the EDVAC’s logical structure. Turing’s 
priorities were a “simple as possible” hardware system 
and a large, fast memory for storage.28 For example, in the 
EDVAC design, arithmetical operations, such as addition 
and multiplication, were accomplished using adder and 
multiplier hardware units. In the EDVAC design, the central 
accumulator performed all arithmetic; however, shoving 
large amounts of data down one avenue could present 
a formidable bottleneck for programs. Turing countered 
this by distributing arithmetical operations across several 
memory locations in an “ingenious way.”29 The larger adder 
and multiplier units, while included in the ACE design, 
were broken into smaller logical units. These improvements 
allowed Turing to economize on the hardware to allow more 
program instructions. For Turing, user convenience was not a 
top priority; in fact, he believed that user convenience could 
be achieved by thought and planning, not by more machine 
hardware.30 The ACE machine was all about speed and 
efficiency.
 As for software execution, the EDVAC and ACE 
designs were completely opposite. Von Neumann enforced 
strict serial execution of program instructions, yet Turing 
allowed for programs to modify their own instructions.31 
Turing’s ACE design also incorporated a unique concept: 
28  Hodges, 320.
29  Ibid., 323.
30  Ibid., 320.
31  Ibid., 324-6.
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optimum coding.32 Simply put, optimum coding “enabled 
more computing to the pound-sterling, as it were,” but this 
greater efficiency came at the cost of difficult, complex, and 
often frustrating programming.33 However, optimum coding 
allowed users to achieve up to four times greater speed over 
conventional contemporary machines.34 Despite making 
extensive use of von Neumann’s notation and figures,35 
Turing’s design distinctly improved upon von Neumann’s 
framework. In fact, Turing completed his ACE proposal in just 
three months, a much shorter time than that of von Neumann 
and his colleagues. By the end of 1945, Turing had a complete 
design from which to work.36 Enthusiasm aside, Turing’s 
personality and work ethic may have influenced the great 
speed with which he completed his ACE proposal. 
 Since his days at Sherborne School, Turing was 
known for his “self-contained” and “solitary” working 
style, “chaotic” mind and difficulty expressing himself, 
and potential for becoming a brilliant mathematician.37 He 
carried these traits with him to King’s College Cambridge. 
For instance, Turing worked completely in solitude when 
developing his 1936 paper. In fact, he was so engrossed 
in his work he was not aware that an American, Alonzo 
32  David M. Yates, Turing’s Legacy: A History of Computing at the National Physical Laboratory 
1945-1995 (London: National Museum of Science and Industry, 1997), 33-4. It is worth noting 
that Turing did not use the term “optimum coding.”
33  Campbell-Kelly, 160.
34  Lavington, Early British Computers, 115-6.
35  Hodges, 328-9.
36  Lavington, “ACES and DEUCES,” 12.
37  Sherborne School, “Grade Report from Sherborne School, Summer Term, 1926.”; 
Sherborne School, “Grade Report from Sherborne School, Lent Term, 1928.”; Sherborne 
School, “Grade Report from Sherborne School, Michaelmas Term, 1927.”
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Church of Princeton, had published his solution to the 
Entscheidungsproblem just months before Turing finished his 
paper.38 Turing also carried his solitary habits into his work 
at Bletchley Park during the Second World War. For example, 
Turing managed “to break into five days’ worth of Enigma 
material” completely independently of the main codebreaking 
efforts; however, the material was mostly trivial pre-war 
intelligence and of little consequence.39 Evidence suggests 
that Turing was driven to solve problems that his colleagues 
ignored; indeed, he took on new projects so he could have 
them to himself.40 This indicates that Turing was strongly self-
driven and self-motivated. 
 Working with Turing could be challenging, particularly 
due to his personality. His colleagues at Bletchley Park found 
him to be an incapable administrator because he was more 
focused on his codebreaking work and private research 
projects.41 Turing was quite a disorganized administrator, 
and he eventually lost his administrative role in Hut 8 at 
Bletchley Park.42 He also had a bad habit of micromanaging 
his colleagues, which often resulted in mutual annoyance.43 
Turing’s initial supervisor, the Cambridge classicist and code 
breaker Dillwyn Knox, found it difficult to manage Turing.44 
Knox remarked that Turing was “very difficult to anchor 
38  Yates, 15.
39  Sinclair McKay, The Secret Life of Bletchley Park: The History of the Wartime Codebreaking 
Centre and the Men and Women Who Were There (London: Aurum, 2010), 47.
40  Ibid., 134.
41  Christopher Grey, Decoding Organization: Bletchley Park, Codebreaking and Organization 
Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 210.
42  McKay, 191. See also Grey, 210.
43  Hodges, 376.
44  McKay, 54-5.
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down,” but his authority was just enough to keep Turing 
at least partially under control.45 Turing was notoriously 
rambunctious, his codebreaking work at Bletchley Park was 
essential to the Allies’ success in the Second World War.
 Turing was also well known for his eccentric behavior, 
such as chaining his coffee mug to a radiator to discourage 
theft. Also, Turing tended to fall into silences for extended 
periods and to stare off into the distance, often staring past 
the people to whom he was engaged in conversation.46 
Conversations with Turing were often hampered by his 
characteristic “hesitating stammer”47 and his unusually high 
voice, which could make his speech difficult to comprehend. 
Turing also had the bad habit of dressing like a hapless 
tramp.48 Indeed, most of Turing’s colleagues at Bletchley 
Park considered him to be a worried “weirdo.”49 What 
is more, Turing became accustomed to a certain level of 
wartime priority. He and a few colleagues wrote directly to 
Winston Churchill to appeal for much-needed supplies and 
personnel. Surprisingly, Churchill granted the request and 
gave high priority to the Bletchley Park staff.50 Ultimately, the 
idiosyncrasies of Turing’s character would contribute to the 
downfall of his ACE project.
 Turing’s ACE project stalled and nearly failed due to 
a combination of inadequate organizational structure, poor 
45  Ibid.
46  Marion Hill, Bletchley Park People: Churchill’s Geese That Never Cackled (Phoenix Mill, UK: 
Sutton Publishing, 2004): 68-9.
47  McKay, 17.
48  Hill, 68.
49  McKay, 17.
50  Hodges, 376.
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administration, and a lack of resources. From the outset, 
the National Physical Laboratory very much adhered to the 
bureaucratic standards expected of government institutions. 
It was composed of a rigid management structure and a strict 
division of labor; however, the NPL lacked a reputation for 
innovation.51 The ACE was a chance to turn that reputation 
around. Under Darwin, Womersley led and directed the 
daily research operations of the Mathematics Division and 
the ACE project. Indeed, Turing would begrudgingly refer 
to Womersley as “my boss.”52 Turing was accustomed to the 
managerial structure of Bletchley Park, and Womersley’s 
managerial style was incongruent with that structure. 
Whereas Turing was interested in solving problems and 
developing computers, Womersley was concerned with 
bureaucracy and results.
 The NPL’s very literal division of labor proved 
detrimental to the progress of the development of Turing’s 
ACE computer. As part of its organizational structure, 
the NPL was divided into different Divisions, such as the 
Mathematics Division or the Radio Division. The construction 
of a computer was a mathematical and logical task in theory 
and design, but the actual device had to be constructed 
by engineers. Turing was allowed his own small team 
of mathematicians and engineers.53 However, the NPL’s 
organizational structure “drew a firm line between brain 
51  Ibid., 339.
52  Ibid., 317.
53  Yates, 24.
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and hand;”54 hence, ignorance of the developments of each 
Division would develop.55 Steady progress would have been 
difficult to maintain at the NPL without a fluid, cohesive 
organizational structure. This would become especially 
evident later when Darwin established the Electronics Section 
as part of the Radio Division.56 The Electronics Section became 
the primary roadblock in the development of the ACE. 
 Turing originally proposed the establishment of an 
in-house electronics section in February 1947 to alleviate the 
pressure on the Mathematics Division.57 After a trip between 
1946 and 1947 to survey the numerous American computer 
projects, Turing expressed his concern that the NPL’s 
organizational structure was inadequate. As Turing remarked 
in a letter,
One point concerning the form of organisation struck  
me very strongly. The engineering work was in every 
case being done in the same building with the more 
mathematical work. I am convinced that this is the 
right approach. It is not possible for the two parts of 
the organisation to keep in sufficiently close touch 
otherwise. They are too deeply interdependent. We 
are frequently finding that we are held up due to 
ignorance of some point which could be cleared up 
by the engineers, and the Post Office find similar 
difficulty; a telephone conversation is seldom effective 
because we cannot use diagrams.58 
54  Hodges, 339.
55  Ibid., 356.
56  Ibid., 366.
57  B. Jack Copeland, “The Origins and Development of the ACE Project,” in Alan Turing’s 
Automatic Computing Engine: The Master Codebreaker’s Struggle to Build the Modern Computer, 
ed. B. Jack Copeland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 69-70.
58  Hodges, 356.
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Turing sought to establish a more cohesive work environment. 
In effect, Turing was betraying his own work ethic; his 
characteristic style was that of a self-driven loner. However, 
a more cohesive unit would establish a sense of stability 
and concentrated effort. In fact, in the same letter, Turing 
explained that the sheer number of American computer 
projects was counterproductive because it stretched thin 
the available resources. In contrast, Turing believed that 
a concentrated effort on one machine in Britain—namely, 
the ACE at the NPL—would prove more fruitful than 
the American efforts. Turing also realized, however, that 
the British effort was “puny” in comparison to the larger 
American projects.59 By 1947, Turing’s ACE project entered 
its second year, and the NPL had little to show for it. Hence, 
progress needed to be stimulated quickly; a cohesive 
organizational structure would expedite this process.
 Darwin established the Electronics Section of the 
Radio Division in summer 1947, and Horace A. Thomas was 
appointed as its supervisor.60 The new Electronics Section 
took several months to install due to poor administration, 
whereas it could have been installed in a matter of weeks. 
Unlike Turing and the ACE group, Thomas was primarily 
interested in the industrial applications of electronics, not 
computing machines.61 For some reason, however, Darwin 
decided that all engineers, including the ACE engineers, 
should fall under the purview of Thomas’s Electronics 
59  Ibid.
60  Ibid., 366.
61  Copeland, 66.
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Section.62 Turing lost his control of his engineers and Thomas 
almost singlehandedly stalled all development. Indeed, the 
ignorant engineers of Thomas’s section replaced the capable 
engineers of the ACE group. Thomas also petitioned Darwin 
to “curtail the construction work in the ACE Section.”63 
Worse yet, after several months of stonewall administration, 
Thomas left the NPL for Unilever Ltd, which led Womersley 
to remark that development was “probably as far advanced 
[as] 18 months ago.”64 While Thomas’s Electronics Section 
was an unfortunate detour on the road to building the ACE, 
the concept of an Electronics Section was not inherently bad. 
Turing recognized the potential benefit of and argued for an 
in-house electronics section,65 but Darwin’s implementation of 
the section was poorly administered. The establishment of the 
Electronics Section should have benefited the ACE project, but 
the relationship between the Mathematics Division and the 
Electronics Section was not as prosperous as desired.
 Evidence suggests that the NPL leadership and 
Turing were often at odds with one another, especially 
when Turing’s authority began to be undermined. In 1947, 
American Harry D. Huskey joined the NPL to spend a one-
year sabbatical working on the ACE project.66 By the time of 
Huskey’s arrival, Turing had completed Version VII of his 
revised ACE design, and progress on the project was at a near 
62  Hendry, 35.
63  Ibid., 69-70.
64  Ibid.
65  Ibid.
66  Hendry, 34-5.
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standstill.67 Huskey proposed to construct a miniature, pilot 
model of the ACE based on Version V of Turing’s design; the 
pilot model was known as the “Test Assembly.” Importantly, 
Huskey revised and made significant changes to Turing’s 
design by stripping Turing’s design of its logical components; 
Huskey believed the machine merely needed to perform 
numerical calculations.68 While this view was consistent with 
Darwin and Womersley’s goals, it was totally incongruous 
with Turing’s vision. Interestingly, B. Jack Copeland 
speculates that a machine such as the Test Assembly, 
“given better management at the NPL,” could have been 
completed in 1948.69 However, Thomas’s Electronics Section 
was established shortly after Huskey introduced his Test 
Assembly. Although Womersley had urged for cooperation 
between Thomas and the ACE group, Thomas’s stonewalling 
of the ACE project nearly killed Huskey’s Test Assembly 
project.70 The Test Assembly could not be completed by 1948 
due to departmental infighting.
 Understandably, Turing did not appreciate Huskey’s 
Test Assembly side project, but he did not actively protest 
it. Turing simply could not understand why anyone would 
want to waste time on a pilot model version of the ACE. 
Indeed, as Teresa Numerico notes, Turing was simply unable 
“to perceive its urgency and strategic importance.”71 For 
67  Copeland, 57.
68  Hodges, 365.
69  Copeland, 69-70.
70  Ibid., 69.
71  Numerico, 187.
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Turing, the ultimate goal was the “grand ACE installation”;72 
on the other hand, the NPL management wanted a proof-of-
concept machine to attract investors and partners.73 While 
Turing never publicly expressed his disdain for the “Test 
Assembly,” Huskey’s side project was a blatant undermining 
of his authority. Huskey took control of the ACE group, and 
all focus was concentrated on the Test Assembly side project.74 
The effort to construct the ACE was further divided as 
valuable resources were diverted to the Test Assembly project. 
In fact, the splintering of Huskey’s group from the main ACE 
group ran counter to Turing’s wish for a cohesive working 
unit, as he outlined in his aforementioned letter. Furthermore, 
Thomas’s Electronics Section policies ensured the limited 
progress of Huskey’s Test Assembly machine. In fact, Thomas 
persuaded Darwin to cease operations on the side project;75 
in response, Huskey remarked, “Morale in the Mathematics 
Division collapsed.”76 Thomas had effectively demoralized 
the ACE personnel. After his departure, Huskey’s Test 
Assembly evolved into the Pilot ACE, which also deviated 
from Turing’s original design.
 As a sign of the deteriorating social atmosphere at 
the NPL, Turing and Womersley exhibited rather passive 
aggressive behavior toward one another. Turing perceived 
Womersley as the epitome of “bogus,”77 and Womersley 
72  Hodges, 365.
73  Numerico, 187.
74  Ibid.
75  Hodges, 372.
76  Copeland, 64.
77  Hodges, 317.
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probably saw Turing as an overly eccentric genius. Womersley 
and Turing purposely avoided contact with another. Andrew 
Hodges recounts in his biography of Turing:
Womersley’s gifts of management: a mastery of 
name-dropping, a genial enthusiasm, a pleasant office 
manner to important visitors, a diplomatic sense of 
what to report, were not skills that Alan Turing ranked 
highly; not just because he lacked them himself, but 
because he still could not understand why anyone 
should need weapons other than rational argument. 
Before long, Alan [Turing] was openly rude to 
Womersley in the office, saying ‘What do you want?’ 
and turning his back if Womersley dared to intrude 
upon some discussion. . . . Conversely, Womersley 
would show visitors round Cromer House, pointing at 
the Turing office from afar with exaggerated awe, and 
saying ‘Ah, that’s Turing, we mustn’t disturb him,’ as of 
some rare zoological exhibit.78 
Turing and Womersley’s managerial styles were utterly 
incompatible. On one hand, Womersley was a stereotypical 
“yes-man” administrator with hardly a mind of his own.79 On 
the other hand, Turing lacked all managerial qualities because 
he did not desire to be a manager.80 The mutual juvenility in 
which Womersley and Turing acted toward one another is 
of interest; however, juvenility is hardly a professional trait, 
and it would not be expected from someone of Womersley’s 
status and position. Then again, the same may be said for 
Turing, though he had a history of disregarding conventional 
standards and expectations. Furthermore, conflicts between 
Turing and Womersley could have scarcely benefited morale.
78  Ibid.
79  Ibid.
80  Ibid., 376.
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 The ACE project lacked the camaraderie to which 
Turing grew accustomed at Bletchley Park.81 If Womersley 
and Turing were at odds with one another on a regular basis, 
the friction and tension would have negatively impacted 
morale. Conflicts in management ran counter to Turing’s wish 
for a cohesive working unit, so it is perplexing that he would 
act compromisingly. Perhaps the frustration of slow progress 
was putting an end to his resolve. As may be inferred from 
Hodges’s anecdote, visitors may have assumed negative 
impressions of the NPL based on Womersley and Turing’s 
actions. These negative impressions further complicated the 
production of the ACE, especially considering these visitors 
were financiers or potential contractors.
 The NPL desperately required financial support, but it 
would be difficult to obtain. Turing’s original ACE proposal 
featured a rather optimistic projected budget of £11,200,82 but 
Womersley recommended increasing the projected cost to 
about £50,000 or £60,000 to make it more realistic.83 However, 
by late 1946, the ACE project was estimated to cost up to 
£125,000.84 The NPL needed the help of the Treasury to fund 
the ACE project.85 Darwin and Womersley proposed a small 
“pilot” machine project, the Pilot ACE, to the Treasury and 
Ministry of Supply. As Hodges reports, the Treasury granted 
£10,000 for the “small-machine,” but this was just an initial 
81  Ibid., 343.
82  Lavington, “ACES and DEUCES,” 12.
83  Yates, 22-3.
84  “Britain to Make a Radio Brain: ‘Ace’ Superior to U.S. Model,” The Daily Telegraph, 
November 7, 1946.
85  Hodges, 337.
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installment. The hope was that a more substantial sum of up 
to £100,000 would be made available for a larger, full-scale 
machine. The Treasury made no guarantees of this larger 
amount.86 In a sense, the Treasury’s small investment was 
an attempt to insure itself in case Turing’s project failed. 
However, the lack of a guarantee for the full amount put 
unnecessary strain on the NPL administration.
 It is worth noting that Max Newman’s Manchester 
University computer project87 was able to avoid the financial 
woes the NPL faced. In 1946, Newman applied to the Royal 
Society for funding. Interestingly, Darwin was a member 
of the Royal Society committee that reviewed Newman’s 
application. Naturally, he attempted to reject the application 
“on the grounds that the ACE was to serve the needs of the 
country.”88 Darwin was overruled, and Newman was granted 
£35,000, a much larger grant than the NPL received from the 
Treasury.89 Newman’s Manchester project would produce the 
Manchester “Baby,” which became the first stored-program 
computer to run a program on June 21, 1948.90 By then, the 
NPL’s Pilot ACE had yet to be built; Darwin’s dream of a 
national computer at the NPL was effectively crushed by 
Newman’s Manchester project.91 
 Ultimately, the ACE project was meant to produce a 
86  Ibid.
87  Max Newman established a computer laboratory at Manchester in late 1945. Newman 
was the first reader of Turing’s 1936 paper, and he understood its significance. Newman also 
worked with Turing at Bletchley Park. For more information, see Lavington, Early British 
Computers, 23-4. See also Hodges 341.
88  Hodges, 341-2.
89  Ibid.
90  Yates, 35.
91  Hodges, 366.
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real, working machine. The NPL lacked engineers capable of 
appreciating Turing’s design92 and the space to accommodate 
the construction of a large computing machine.93 Thus, 
outside contractors were needed to supply manpower and 
materials for construction of the ACE. The NPL made at least 
three efforts to obtain contracts with outside organizations. 
The first attempt was a concerted effort to forge a contract 
with the Post Office Research Station at Dollis Hill. Engineers 
at the Post Office had made great strides in mercury delay line 
storage technology during the Second World War. Turing’s 
ACE design called for the use of electroacoustic mercury 
delay lines as its storage medium.94 Unfortunately, the Post 
Office’s Dollis Hill facilities were hopelessly inadequate 
for construction of the ACE.95 The Post Office also had an 
extensive backlog of projects of its own to complete, let alone 
a new project from the NPL.96 The NPL was unable to secure a 
contract with the Post Office, but it persisted in trying to farm 
out contracts to other organizations.97
 After the Post Office contract foundered, the NPL 
tried to establish a contract with the Telecommunications 
Research Establishment (TRE) at Malvern. The TRE was 
attractive even more so than the Post Office because it had 
the experienced engineers that the NPL group desperately 
needed, particularly F. C. Williams. At the TRE, Williams 
92  Ibid., 338.
93  Hendry, 34.
94  Ibid.
95  Numerico, 181.
96  Hodges, 340.
97  Copeland, 61.
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was experimenting with applications of cathode ray tubes.98 
Turing saw cathode ray tubes as a possible alternative to 
mercury delay lines for the ACE’s storage medium, but this 
suggestion was not well received.99 The NPL simply could 
not afford another major delay. Moreover, most of the able 
technicians the TRE could spare had been transferred to 
the Department of Atomic Energy. Also, attempts to recruit 
Williams soured because he was more interested in building 
his computer, rather than the NPL’s computer, Newman 
recruited Williams to join the Manchester computer project. 
The TRE could only offer a small staff to be directed under 
Williams at Manchester;100 thus, the TRE’s attractiveness 
waned. Unfortunately for Turing and the NPL, the TRE 
contract foundered.101
 After the failures with the Post Office and the TRE, 
Darwin eventually turned to the English Electric Company 
in late 1948.102 Sir George Nelson was the Chairman of 
English Electric; also, he was a member of the NPL Executive 
Committee.103 Despite being rather incestuous, the partnership 
was a much-needed break. English Electric loaned NPL a 
small staff of engineers, which finally built the Pilot ACE 
machine from January 1949 until completion in May 1950.104 
Unlike its governmental contemporaries, however, English 
Electric was only interested in the Pilot ACE for the purpose 
98  Yates, 24.
99  Hodges, 340.
100  Ibid., 349-50.
101  Copeland, 61.
102  Ibid., 74-5.
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of commercial production.105
 Even after the NPL’s Pilot ACE was completed in 
1950, English Electric still did not have a concrete design 
for a commercial version. Indeed, as John Hendry notes, 
English Electric was uninterested in “the commercial 
exploitation of computers.”106 English Electric’s attitude is 
perplexing because the company’s sole purpose in aiding 
the NPL was to commercially exploit the Pilot ACE design. 
However, for some reason, the company did not want to 
commercialize computers. Nevertheless, English Electric’s 
efforts to commercialize the Pilot ACE were too late to make 
a significant difference in the world of commercialized 
computers.
 English Electric waited until the autumn of 1954, a few 
months after Turing’s untimely death, to begin developing 
a “fully engineered version of the Pilot ACE to be called the 
DEUCE;” English Electric had no intentions at this point of 
marketing the DEUCE.107 Eventually, between 1955 and 1957, 
English Electric began manufacturing the DEUCE, but the 
company still made no active efforts to market the machine.108 
By the time the DEUCE was made commercially available 
in 1955,109 it was already on the verge of obsolescence. For 
instance, the British Atomic Weapons Research Establishment 
(AWRE) ordered a DEUCE machine, but, by early 1956, the 
105  Ibid., 43.
106  Ibid., 69.
107  Ibid., 105.
108  Ibid., 119.
109  Lavington, “ACES and DEUCES,” 19.
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DEUCE was unable to keep up with the AWRE’s demands.110 
In the end, English Electric only produced 33 DEUCE units, of 
which 12 units remained with the company.111 Although over 
half of the manufactured DEUCE units were sold, the DEUCE 
was woefully inadequate for practical operation and research, 
and was a veritable flop.
 The situation at the NPL continued to worsen, 
culminating in Turing’s resignation on May 28, 1948112 and 
Darwin’s resignation in 1949.113 Darwin and Womersley grew 
tired of Turing as progress on the ACE project stagnated. 
Indeed, conditions were so poor that Darwin and Womersley 
suggested that Turing should “go off for a spell” to 
Cambridge, with the understanding that Turing would return 
to the NPL.114 Turing agreed to take the sabbatical, but he 
would return to neither the ACE project nor the NPL. During 
his sabbatical, Turing came back under the influence of his old 
colleague Max Newman. At Newman’s behest, Turing joined 
the Manchester computer project,115 but was too late to make 
any substantial contributions to the project before the “Baby” 
ran its first programs in June 1948.116 Although Turing had no 
legal obligation to return to the NPL, Darwin was frustrated 
with him for joining a “rival” computer project.117 While 
work on the ACE continued in Turing’s absence, it was as 
110  Hendry, 120.
111  Lavington, “ACES and DEUCES,” 19.
112  Ibid., 17.
113  Hodges, 407.
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painfully slow as when Turing was present. In fact, when Jim 
Wilkinson—an ACE engineer—visited Turing in Cambridge, 
he brought news of “cuts, crises, and an ever-narrowing 
vision” at the NPL.118 Wilkinson’s account is strong evidence 
that Turing may not have been the only reason for the ACE 
project’s slow progress, as Darwin and Womersley may have 
suspected. Nevertheless, the Pilot ACE machine survived to 
completion and ran its first program on May 10, 1950.119 
 However, by 1950, the Pilot ACE was no longer 
Turing’s machine.120 The Pilot ACE was more Huskey’s 
machine since it evolved from the Test Assembly. After 
its successful 1950 demonstrations, the Pilot ACE was 
transformed into the English Electric DEUCE, which saw an 
extremely limited commercial success.121 Finally, in 1957, a 
full-scale version of the ACE was completed,122 and it was a 
much more complete realization of Turing’s dream to build a 
Universal Turing Machine.123 Turing’s ACE project at the NPL 
was a veritable disaster; indeed, he would rarely speak of it 
after he resigned.124
 Turing had left the NPL for Manchester before the Pilot 
ACE—or the full ACE, for that matter—reached completion. 
The Pilot ACE machine of 1950 was derived from Turing’s 
118  Hodges, 372.
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designs, but it strayed from his philosophy and goal.125 The 
full ACE machine was finally completed in 1957, at which 
time A. M. Uttley of the NPL remarked, “Today Turing’s 
dream has come true.”126 However, by 1957, it was too little 
too late. The ACE design, relatively revolutionary in 1945 
and 1946, was on the verge of obsolescence in 1957. It could 
be concluded, perhaps, that the nightmarish process of 
constructing the ACE had little benefit, except for serving as 
a step toward Turing’s later advances in computer science, 
particularly in artificial intelligence at Manchester.127
 While Turing and von Neumann may have been 
working independently on different computing projects, 
they were hardly without mutual influence. Indeed, von 
Neumann’s EDVAC Report heavily influenced Turing’s 
ACE proposal, and von Neumann relied heavily upon the 
theoretical Turing machine. However, von Neumann’s 
abstract EDVAC design has garnered a considerable influence 
in computer science. Turing was much less fortunate in 
that his ACE machine fell almost completely into obscurity. 
While both men may be considered “fathers” of the modern 
computer, both men did not come about their titles in 
the same way. Both men took different approaches to the 
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same problem, encountered different situations, but von 
Neumann’s abstract EDVAC design boasts a much more 
successful legacy than Turing’s real ACE machine. 
 As per its original initiative, Britain successfully 
exploited the new field of computing research. However, 
that successful exploitation came in the form of Newman’s 
Manchester computer project. While Britain again shared the 
international stage with United States, it was not Turing’s 
doing. Indeed, Turing’s ACE was constructed too late to 
significantly influence computer architecture design. Turing’s 
ACE ultimately failed to meet its original purpose of being 
the national computer of Britain. Thus, it would appear that 
Turing and his colleagues wasted much of their time and 
energy for an impractical and unmarketable computer.
